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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Lori Ann Phillips appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and
Order. She asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
to present the portion of Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, an audio CD, which involved conversations
between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about obtaining much larger
quantities of methamphetamine for a future sale.

Ms. Phillips asserts that the

conversations about future sales are not relevant and are overly prejudicial.
Additionally, Ms. Phillips was sentenced to unified terms of ten years, with three
years fixed, to be served consecutively. She asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing her to excessive sentences without properly considering the
mitigating factors that exist in this case.

Furthermore, Ms. Phillips asserts that the

district court abused its discretion by denying her Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) motion for a reduction of sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 8, 2010, an Information was filed charging Ms. Phillips with two counts
of trafficking in methamphetamine.

(R., pp.39-42.)

Eventually, the Information was

amended to two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
(R., pp.102-104.) Ms. Phillips entered not guilty pleas to both charges. (R., pp.94-95.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.149-154, 186-191.)
At trial, the State presented the testimony of the officers involved in the controlled
buys. (Tr.10/20/10, p.24, L.9 - p.132, L 11.) The State also presented the testimony of
the

forensic

scientist

who

preformed

the

1

testing

on

the

methamphetamine.

(Tr.10/21/10, p.151, L.9-p.175, L.10.) The final witness was Mr. Avila Duckett, the Cl,
who testified about purchasing methamphetamine from Ms. Phillips on two occasions.
(Tr.10/21/10, p.175, L.21 - p.211, 1.18.)

He also supplied the foundation for the

admittance of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, an audio recording of the March 12, 2009, controlled
purchase of methamphetamine. (Tr.10/21/10, p.196, L.23 - p .199, L.15.) The State
and defense rested following Mr. Avila Duckett's testimony. (Tr.10/21/10, p.211, L.24,
p.213, Ls. 20-21.)

Thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts for both counts.

(R., p.185.)
At sentencing, the State recommended unified sentences of ten years, with three
years fixed, for count 1, and twelve years, with four years fixed, for count 2, to be served
concurrently.

(Tr.1 /24/11, p.26, Ls.10-16.)

Defense counsel requested underlying

unified sentences of seven years, with two years fixed, for each count, to be served
concurrently, and either probation or a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr.1/24/11, p.33,
Ls.6-9.)

The presentence investigator recommended that the district court retain

jurisdiction.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.)

The district

court departed from the recommendations and imposed unified sentences of ten years,
with three years fixed, for each count, to be served consecutively.

(R., pp.203-205.)

Ms. Phillips filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction and Order.

(R., pp.214-216.)

Ms. Phillips also filed a timely Motion to

Reconsider Sentence. (Augmentation: Motion to Reconsider Sentence.) The district
court denied the motion.

(Augmentation: Order Denying the Defendant's Motion to

Reconsider Sentence.)

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the portion of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 6, which involved conversations between the confidential informant and
Ms. Phillips about obtaining much larger quantities of methamphetamine for a
future sale because it was not relevant and was overly prejudicial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Ms. Phillips,
unified sentences of ten years, with three years fixed, to be served consecutively,
following her conviction for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Phillips' Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Portion Of Plaintiffs Exhibit 6,
Which Involved Conversations Between The Confidential Informant And Ms. Phillips
About Obtaining Much Larger Quantities Of Methamphetarnine For A Future Sale
Because It Was Not Relevant And Was Overly Prejudicial

A.

Introduction
Ms. Phillips asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed

the State to present evidence that was not relevant to the charges in the case at hand.
The State was allowed to present Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, an audio CD, a portion of which
involved conversations between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about
obtaining much larger quantities of methamphetamine for a future sale.

Further,

assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence to be relevant, Ms. Phillips
asserts the evidence is overly prejudicial.

8.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
564 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112 (2005) ). This Court must
examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an
exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
determinations of relevancy are reviewed de nova.
218 (Ct. App. 2009).
4

However,

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Portion Of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 6, Which Involved Conversations Between The Confidential Informant
And Ms. Phillips About Obtaining Much Larger Quantities Of Methamphetamine
For A Future Sale, Because It Was Not Relevant
Defense counsel objected to the admittance of the portions of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6,

which involved conversations between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about
obtaining much larger quantities of methamphetamine for a future sale on the basis that
the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial effect, confusion
of the issues, and that it may mislead the jury. (Tr.10/21/10, p.141, L.18 - p.142, L.B.)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence
is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is
freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008).
In the case at hand, the facts of consequence were those facts related to the
potential commission of the crimes charged in the information, the alleged delivery of
methamphetamine to the Cl on two distinct occasions.

Evidence regarding a larger,

possible, future sale does not make it more or less probable that Ms. Phillips had
committed the charged crimes in this case. As such, the evidence was not relevant to
the case at hand and should not have been admitted.

5

D.

Assuming Arguendo That The Portion Of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Which Involved
Conversations Between The Confidential Informant And Ms. Phillips About
Obtaining Much Larger Quantities Of Methamphetamine For A Future Sale Was
Relevant, The Evidence Was Not Admissible Because The Evidence Was More
Prejudicial Than Probative
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect

outweighs any limited probative value.

I.R.E. 403 states that "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... " 1.R.E. 403.
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied.

State

v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). I.R.E. 403 creates a balancing test. On one

hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107
(1987).

At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the

evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).

The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it

harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id.
In the case at hand, the portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which involved
conversations between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about obtaining much
larger quantities of methamphetamine for a future sale, was unfairly prejudicial. This
portion of the audio portrays Ms. Phillips as a very dangerous drug dealer, not just a
person selling small amounts of methamphetamine, but as a large provider and
6

substantial threat to society. This paints Ms. Phillips in an unfavorable light and places
an undue burden on the jury, not only to weigh the evidence of the charges in front of
them, but to protect society from a person placing very large amounts of a very
dangerous drug out into the community.
Ms. Phillips maintains that this portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 has limited or no
probative value and could not assist the jury in determining whether the charged acts
had occurred. As such, the limited value of the evidence does not weigh in favor of its
introduction when the evidence is weighed against its prejudicial effect. Ultimately, this
evidence worked to poison the minds of the jury against Ms. Phillips. The prejudice
suffered by Ms. Phillips though the admission of this portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6
amounts to unfair prejudice. As such, the district court clearly abused its discretion in
allowing the admittance of this portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 because the probative
value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

E.

The Admittance Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
Ms. Phillips contends that this error was not harmless.

Because there was a

timely objection, Ms. Phillips only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which
point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, (2010). The State cannot show
the error was harmless in this case.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Ms. Phillips, Unified
Sentences Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, To Be Served Consecutively
Following Her Conviction For Two Counts Of Delivery Of A Controlled Substance
Ms. Phillips asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentences of
ten years, with three years fixed, to be served consecutively, are excessive. Where a
defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence,
the

appellate court will conduct an

independent review of the record

giving

consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Phillips does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Ms. Phillips must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)).
Ms. Phillips asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating
factors that exist in her case. Specifically, she asserts that the district court failed to give
proper consideration to her admitted substance abuse problem and desire for treatment.
8

Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for
treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that
court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Ms. Phillips first used methamphetamine at the age of 44. (PSI, p.7.) She used
only when it was available, but did sell methamphetamine to support her habit. (PSI,
p.7 .) Her last use was in April of 2010. (PSI, p.7.) Ms. Phillips had never participated
in substance abuse treatment and would like to in order to stop using drugs. (PSI, p.7.)
Prior to sentencing, she was attending AA meetings.

(PSI, p.7.)

Ms. Phillips has

acknowledged the negative effect using methamphetamine has had on her life, noting
that, "I have two good boys that do not do drugs and the worst part of all of this is the
disappointment in my two boys['] faces and hoping that I will get back the respect that I
feel I lost because of the drugs." (PSI, p.4.) It was recommended that Ms. Phillips
participate in Level I outpatient treatment. (PSI Attachment, GAIN-I Recommendation
and Referral Summary, p.7.)
Additionally, prior to these offenses, Ms. Phillips has never been convicted of a
felony. (PSI, p.3.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."

State v.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971 )). The defendant

in Hoskins pied guilty to two counts of drawing a check without funds. Id. The Hoskins
Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the absence of any
prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the
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sentence.

Id at 675.

Other than traffic citations, Ms. Phillips' only criminal history

involves a misdemeanor willful concealment conviction in 1990. (PSI, p.3.)
Furthermore, Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 192523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Ms. Phillips has been previously
diagnosed as suffering from depression sometime between 1988 and 1990. (PSI, p.7.)
In the past, she has taken anti-depressants. (PSI, p.7.) She would like to participate in
counseling because she feels like sleeping all the time and also feels a lot of sadness.
(PSI, p.7.)

More recently, she was diagnosed with Amphetamine Dependence with

Physiological

symptoms and

Mood

Disorder NOS.

(PSI Attachment,

GAIN-I

Recommendation and Referral Summary, p.2.) She was also diagnosed as suffering
from Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe Without Psychotic Features during
her mental health assessment.

(Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, p.5.)

It

was

Phillips participate in

a

recommended that Ms.

individual treatment and

consultation for medication management. (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment,
p.6.)
Additionally, Ms. Phillips has expressed her remorse for committing the instant
offense. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals
reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. At the sentencing hearing,
Ms. Phillips stated that, "I made a mistake. It's not something that I'm proud of.

I'm

trying to do better and I've been on the straight and narrow and I just hope that you just
give me another chance." (Tr.1/24/11, p.34, Ls.2-5.) Ms. Phillips also expressed her
10

remorse when completing the PSI.

She noted that she felt embarrassed about her

charges and wrote that, "... and worst of all how I lost my self respect and respect of
others and my two sons and their look of disappointment at me now." (PSI, p.3.)
In her PSI final comments to the district court Ms. Phillips wrote:
If I had the chance to do things over again I would have never started
using meth or selling it to support my habit by using this drug I lost alot
[sic]. I lost my self respect and the respect of my [family] and the
[community] I live in, maybe my house and most important my freedom. I
have honestly say that I'm done with drugs and the people that do them.
I'm [truly] sorry for all the wrong I have done.
(PSI, p.9.)
Further, Ms. Phillips has been able to find and maintain employment in the past.
(PSI, pp.6-7.) Although she had been laid off from her most recent job, she would be
considered for rehire. (PSI, p.6.) Ms. Phillips has experience working as a truck driver,
casher, supervisor, and business owner. (PSI, p.7.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Phillips asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences upon her.

She asserts

that had the district court properly considered her substance abuse, desire for
treatment, status as a first time felony offender, mental health issues, remorse, and
employment opportunities, it would have crafted sentences that focused on her
rehabilitation rather than incarceration.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Phillips' Rule 35 Motion
For A Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,

11

125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987)
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether
the original sentence was reasonable."

Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450).

"If the

sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for
reduction.

Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)).

"When

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Ms. Phillips supplied new or additional information to the district court in her Rule
35 motion. (Augmentation: Motion to Reconsider Sentence.) Specifically, the motion
stated the following grounds for a reduction of sentence:
1. The Defendant was not a major player, as the State was not aware of
her participation, until the Cl listed her as a possible source.
2. The Defendant had been involved in the drug scene for less than two
(2) years.
3. The Defendant has an addiction herself, for which she is trying to get
help.
4. The Defendant has a minor prior criminal record, and these are her
first felonies.
5. The Defendant should not be sentenced substantially harsher for
exercising her constitutional right to a trial by jury.
6. The Defendant's sentence seemed to be the same, as if she was
convicted of trafficking, for which she was not.
7. The consecutive sentences for these two State "Cl" buys was
inconsistent with similar non-trial convictions, and therefore, unduly
harsh.
8. The Defendant had, at the time of the offenses, mental health issues,
which coupled with the potential loss of the family homestead, should
have mitigated the harshness of the sentence.
(Augmentation: Motion to Reconsider Sentence.)
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Ms. Phillips asserts that in light of the above additional information and the
mitigating factors mentioned in section II, which need not be repeated, but are
incorporated by reference, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 35
motion.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Phillips respectfully requests that her convictions be vacated and her case
remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce her
sentences as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that the order denying
her Rule 35 motion be vacated and the cases remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 1J1h day of January, 2012.

--ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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